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IN DEFENSE OF DISPARATE IMPACT:
AN OPPORTUNITY TO REALIZE THE PROMISE OF THE
FAIR HOUSING ACT
Valerie Schneider*
ABSTRACT
Twice in the past three years, the Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in Fair Housing cases, and, each time, under pressure from civil
rights leaders who feared that the Supreme Court might narrow current
Fair Housing Act jurisprudence, the cases settled just weeks before oral
argument. Settlements after the Supreme Court grants certiorari are
extremely rare, and, in these cases, the settlements reflect a substantial fear
among civil rights advocates that the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in
cases such as Shelby County v. Holder and Fisher v. University of Texas
are working to dismantle many of the protections of the Civil Rights
legislation of the 1960s. The sole issue in both of the recently settled Fair
Housing Act cases was whether disparate impact analysis – a type of
analysis that some on the Supreme Court may view as requiring racial
preferences – is valid under the Fair Housing Act.
This article argues that in order to have a chance at achieving the
goal of its sponsors – “to replace the ghettos [with] truly integrated and
balanced living patterns,” – the Fair Housing Act cannot just take aim at
the aberrant individual who intentionally denies a person housing because
of his or her race. Instead, the Fair Housing Act must recognize claims
based on disparate impact analysis alone. This article argues that
disparate impact analysis is especially needed to address urban
redevelopment decisions because such decisions are often made through a
multi-party protracted process, in which a discriminatory intent may be
impossible to discern or entirely absent. Additionally, it is the outcome of
large-scale urban redevelopment projects that will truly shape racial
housing patterns in the twenty-first century.
*
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INTRODUCTION
“[T]he arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as
disastrous and unfair to private rights and the public
interest as the perversity of a willful scheme.”1
In the past few Supreme Court terms, the Supreme Court has
seemed inclined to tighten its grip on anything it deems a “racial
preference.” In the 2012-2013 term alone, the Supreme Court stripped the
Voting Rights Act of its main enforcement mechanism and narrowed its
acceptance of affirmative action programs.2 It appears that the Supreme
Court is now hoping to limit the existing interpretation of another one of the
main pillars of the Civil Rights era—the Fair Housing Act.
Twice in the past three years the Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in Fair Housing cases, and, each time, under pressure from civil
rights leaders who feared that the Supreme Court might narrow current Fair
Housing Act jurisprudence, the cases settled weeks before oral argument.3

1

United States v. City of Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974)
(quoting Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967)).
2
Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013) and Fisher v. University of Texas,
113 S.Ct. 2411 (2013)
3
See Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mt. Holly, 658 F.3d 375
(3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3689 (U.S. June 17, 2013) (No.11–1507);
Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3280 (U.S.
Nov. 7, 2011) (No. 10–1032). For information related to the concern among civil rights
leaders that the Supreme Court is intent on limiting disparate impact analysis, see Joan
Biskupic, Analysis: Rights Groups Try to Avoid U.S. High Court Setback, REUTERS (Mar.
2, 2012, 12:23 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/02/us-usa-court-civil-rightsidUSTRE82117X20120302 (“Civil rights advocates took extraordinary steps over the last
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The sole issue in both of these cases was whether disparate impact analysis
– a type of analysis that some on the court may view as requiring racial
preferences – is valid under the Fair Housing Act.
This article argues that preserving disparate impact analysis is
critical to ensuring that the Fair Housing Act has a chance to fulfill its
mission of decreasing housing segregation, increasing housing opportunities
for minorities and ending housing discrimination. Furthermore, I argue that
the facts of many modern housing discrimination cases, particularly in the
urban redevelopment context, are particularly appropriate for disparate
impact analysis.

In urban redevelopment cases, racially disparate and

segregation-increasing impacts often flow not from a single decision-maker
intent on treating minorities differently (which could be addressed by
disparate treatment analysis), but from a diffuse system in which intent is
not relevant to an inquiry into whether the principles of the Fair Housing
Act have been upheld.

three months to persuade the city of St. Paul, Minn., to withdraw a fair-housing case the
U.S. Supreme Court had already agreed to hear, reflecting their expressed fears about the
court under Chief Justice John Roberts.”); see Emily Gurnon, St. Paul Withdraws U.S.
Supreme Court Petition in Housing Discrimination Case, PIONEER PRESS (Feb. 10, 2012,
5:33 PM), http://www.twincities.com/ci_19938569; see also Adam Liptak, Housing Case
Is Settled Before It Goes to Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2013, at A18, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/14/us/fair-housing-case-is-settled-before-it-reachessupreme-court.html?_r=0; see also David O’Reilly, Mount Holly Gardens Discrimination
Dispute Settled, PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 15, 2013), http://articles.philly.com/2013-1115/news/44078231_1_township-residents-olga-pomar-south-jersey-legal-services; Valerie
Schneider, Settlement in Fair Housing Case --A Sigh of Relief, ACSBLOG (Nov. 14, 2013),
http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/settlement-in-fair-housing-case-a-sigh-of-relief.
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The Supreme Court’s apparent interest in limiting the use of
disparate impact analysis in Fair Housing cases is a recent phenomenon.4
Since the enactment of the Fair Housing Act forty-five years ago, Fair
Housing jurisprudence, which is modeled in large part on employment
discrimination jurisprudence, has treated disparate impact analysis as a
given—the eleven circuits that have confronted the issue have all assumed
or decided that suits based on harms that have a disparate impact on
members of a protected class are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act,
regardless of whether those perpetrating the harms had a discriminatory
intent.5

4

Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having any Impact? An Appellate
Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims under the Fair Housing Act, 63 AM. U.
L. REV. ___ (2013)
5
See United States v. City of Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d 1179, 1184–85 (8th Cir.
1974); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th
Cir. 1977) [hereinafter Arlington Heights II]; Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d
126, 146 (3d Cir. 1977); Halet v. Wend Inv. Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1982);
Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682, F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Marengo Cnty. Comm’n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1559 n.20 (11th Cir. 1984); Arthur v. City of
Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 574–75 (6th Cir. 1986); Hanson v. Veterans Admin., 800 F.2d 1381,
1386 (5th Cir. 1986); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926,
935 (2d Cir. 1988); Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev.
56 F.3d 1243, 1250–51 (10th Cir. 1995); Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43,
49 (1st Cir. 2000); see also Sherman Ave. Tenants’ Ass’n. v. District of Columbia, 444
F.3d 673, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[E]very one of the eleven circuits to have considered the
issue has held that the Fair Housing Act . . . prohibits not only intentional housing
discrimination, but also housing actions having a disparate impact.”). White it is true that
the eleven circuits that have confronted a disparate impact challenge have decided or
assumed that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act, I note
that, in Arlington Heights II, the 7th Circuit suggested that some finding of intent might be
required. That said, as explained in Section V of this article, HUD recently promulgated a
regulation formalizing the burden-shifting approach. Under the rule, the burden-shifting
approach is as follows: “(1) the charging party first bears the burden of proving its prima
facie case of either disparate impact or perpetuation of segregation; (2) then the burden
shifts to the defendant to prove that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or
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This article seeks to understand Supreme Court’s recent interest in
limiting the use of disparate impact analysis in Fair Housing cases, and it
argues that, without disparate impact analysis, there is little hope that the
Fair Housing Act will be able to nudge our society in the direction of less
segregated living patterns and more housing opportunities for minorities.
The first section of this article describes the story behind the most
recent disparate impact case that made its way to the Supreme Court and
was settled just weeks before argument: Township of Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holly
Gardens Citizens In Action, Inc. Additionally, Section I provides historical
context regarding passage of the Fair Housing Act and the progression of
Fair Housing jurisprudence.
In the second section, I confront textualists who insist that, because
the Fair Housing Act does not contain the magic word “affect,” it is
unconcerned with acts that disproportionately burden members of protected
classes.

In this section, I dissect the text of the Fair Housing Act to

demonstrate that its language supports disparate impact analysis like its
cousins, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) (both of which have been held
to support disparate impact claims by the Supreme Court and the first of

more of its legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests; and (3) if the defendant satisfies its
burden, the charging party may still establish liability by demonstrating that the substantial,
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which was amended to explicitly include such claims).
The third section of this article turns to scholarship that suggests that
the disparate impact theory is simply a way to show intentional
discrimination through circumstantial or indirect evidence6—i.e. if you
cannot prove discriminatory intent by showing that a housing provider
made racist comments, maybe discriminatory intent can be inferred by
looking at evidence that a policy has a disproportionate impact on
minorities.7 Here I argue that, while evidence of disparate impact can
certainly strengthen an intentional discrimination claim, a claim based on
unintentional discrimination can also stand on its own under the Fair
Housing Act.
The fourth section contains the meat of this article. It examines the
manner

in

which

municipalities

actually

make

housing-related

legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests could be served by a practice that has a less
discriminatory effect. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2013).
6
See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV.
701, 706 (2006) (arguing that the development of disparate impact theory in the
employment discrimination context had the perverse effect of truncating the development
of intentional discrimination jurisprudence);
7
See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th
Cir. 1977) (holding that under some circumstances a violation of the FHA can be
established by showing discriminatory effect without showing enough discriminatory intent
as required in Equal Protection jurisprudence after Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976)); see generally Selmi, supra note 6. According to Arlington Heights II four factors
should be considered when there is not a strong showing of discriminatory intent: (1) the
strength in plaintiff’s showing of discriminatory effect; (2) evidence of discriminatory
intent, “though not enough to satisfy the constitutional standard of Washington v. Davis”;
(3) the defendant’s interest in taking the action that produced the discriminatory impact; (4)
whether the plaintiff seeks “to compel the defendant from interfering with individual
property owners who wish to provide such housing.” Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at
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redevelopment decisions. I posit that, because of the diffuse and non-linear
manner in which housing-related decisions are made, particularly in the
context of so-called “urban redevelopment” projects, intent to discriminate
may never be found (and, indeed, may not exist), even where there is a clear
discriminatory impact which undermines the purpose of the Fair Housing
Act. For the Fair Housing Act to have a legitimate role in nudging our
society closer to equality in housing opportunities across racial lines,
redevelopment decisions must be subject to disparate impact analysis.
In the final section of this article, I examine common concerns about
disparate impact jurisprudence and propose some methods for addressing
such concerns.

I. THE STORY BEHIND THE STORY
A. Mt. Holly, New Jersey

The human story behind the most recent disparate impact case that
settled shortly before the Supreme Court was to hear oral arguments Township of Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens In Action, Inc. –
highlights the ways in which, in the urban redevelopment context, intent to
discriminate may be irrelevant to an inquiry into whether the principles of
the Fair Housing Act have been upheld.

1290.
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The plaintiffs in Mt. Holly were former and current residents of
Mount Holly Gardens (the “Gardens”), a subdivision in Mount Holly
Township, New Jersey (the “Township”), who sued the Township in an
effort to block redevelopment plans. Those redevelopment plans called for
the complete demolition of all existing homes in the Gardens community in
order to make way for a new residential development, the prices of which
would be out of reach for almost all of the Gardens current and former
residents—essentially, the planned development would have wiped the one
majority-minority community in the Township off the map, scattering its
minority residents to even more segregated communities.8
The Gardens was originally constructed in the 1950s to house
military families, and it consisted of approximately 325 two-story brick row
houses.

By the 1970s, the neighborhood suffered from many of the

problems associated with underserved and poor communities—population
growth stressed the infrastructure of the neighborhood and crime rates rose

8

Brief in Opposition for Mt. Holly Gardens Respondents at 1, 8, Twp. of Mount Holly
v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, No. 11-1507 (Sept. 11, 2012) (“The court below
observed that the Township was purchasing Gardens homes for $32,000 to $49,000 and
that ‘[t]he estimated cost of a new home in the development was between $200,000 and
$275,000, well outside the range of affordability for a significant portion of the AfricanAmerican and Hispanic residents of the Township.’”). The relocation-assistance plan was
“woefully inadequate” and had the effect of displacing Gardens residents from the
neighborhood. The plan capped the amount of assistance at a maximum amount “far lower
than the estimated cost of a new home in the Villages at Parker’s Mill.” Brief for Mt.
Holly Gardens Respondents at 11, Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly gardens Citizens in
Action, Inc., No. 11-1507 (Oct. 21, 2013) (“Given the ‘severe shortage of affordable
housing’ in Burlington County, many Gardens renters reported being unable to find
affordable housing elsewhere in the Township . . . [a]nd more than two-thirds of renters
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steadily.9 In response to these circumstances, members of the tightknit
neighborhood came together to address challenges.

In the 1970s, for

example, residents formed a nonprofit called “Mt. Holly Citizens in Action”
(the named plaintiff in the Mt. Holly case), which worked with residents and
Township officials to help address problems in the community.10
Additionally, in the 1990s, community activists worked to revitalize the
Gardens by rehabilitating properties and advocating for increased social
services. These efforts resulted in the renovation of ten homes and the
establishment of a community-policing center.11
Despite the improvements, the infrastructure in the community
continued to fail while the crime rate ticked upwards.

In 2002, the

Township commissioned a study to determine whether Gardens should be
designated as an “area in need of redevelopment” pursuant to New Jersey’s
redevelopment laws.12

Over the strong opposition of many Gardens

residents, the study concluded that the entire Gardens neighborhood was
“blighted.”13

who accepted Township assistance were relocated out of the Township.”).
9
Brief in Opposition for Mt. Holly Gardens Respondents at 4–5, Twp. of Mount Holly
v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, No. 11-1507 (Sept. 11, 2012) (noting the increase
in crime and noting the fact that the community suffered from severe drainage problems
due to residents paving back yards as parking in the area became more scarce).
10
Id. at 4.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 5 (noting that the municipal plan used the word “blighted” to describe the
entire community).
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The Township adopted a redevelopment plan in 2003, which was
amended in 2005 and 2008.

The most recent plan called for the

construction of up to 520 townhomes and apartments, of which only fiftysix would be designated as “affordable housing,” and of those fifty-six, only
eleven would be offered to existing Gardens residents on a priority basis.14
Unfortunately, for almost all of the residents of the Gardens, even the most
“affordable” homes in the new development would be out of reach—few, if
any, members of the existing community would be able to stay in their
homes and benefit from the revitalization of the neighborhood.
With a redevelopment plan in place, the Township began to
dismantle the Gardens community. Starting in 2002, the Township began to
purchase homes in the Gardens at prices ranging from $32,000 to $49,000, a
price that would do little to allow residents to relocate within Mt. Holly or
any non-segregated nearby areas.15 Despite this, sensing that the Township
might exercise eminent domain rights if they did not acquiesce, many
residents and landlords took the deals offered to them and fled. Unable to
afford homes nearby with the money offered by the township, most former
residents moved from the relatively diverse Township to much more
segregated communities. As a result, the Township became increasingly
white while already segregated communities became even more

14

Id. at 6.
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segregated.16

Within a few years, more than 200 homes were purchased by the
Township and destroyed.17 Many of the homes that were demolished were
attached to ones where residents remained, leaving broken bricks, gaps,
leakage and drainage problems for the residents who wished to stay in their
homes.

As of June, 2011, of the 325 original brick row houses, only

seventy homes remained under private ownership.18
Explaining why she did not wish to leave the Gardens
neighborhood, one of the few remaining residents said, “When I bought the
house, I thought I’d be here for the rest of my days.”19 Another resident
remarked, “My children are here. My roots are here. My grandkids live
around the neighborhood. I don’t want to go nowhere. I want to stay in
Mount Holly.”20

The few remaining residents live among empty lots,

destroyed homes and damaged infrastructure.21

15

Id. at 8.
See Id. at 3.
17
Id. at 9.
18
Id. at 8.
19
Inst. for Justice, Scorched Earth: Eminent Domain Abuse in the Gardens of Mount
Holly at 5:10, YOUTUBE (Mar. 10, 2011),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QMDnCcSUfao.
20
Id. at 5:20.
21
The Mt. Holly case is the second of two disparate impact cases for which the
Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the past two years. The first of the two cases—
Magner v. Gallagher—was particularly troubling to proponents of disparate impact claims
because it was brought by an unusual and unsympathetic set of plaintiffs in the Fair
Housing context—landlords who owned dilapidated housing.
In Gallagher, sixteen
landlords (three of whom where non-white) sued the City of St. Paul, claiming that the
16
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As noted above, the Gardens was the only neighborhood in the
Township with predominantly African-American and Hispanic residents.
According to the 2000 Census, of the 1,301 residents of the Gardens, 46.1%
were African-American, 28.8% were Hispanic, and 19.7% were nonHispanic whites.22 The Township’s plan to destroy the Gardens and replace
it with housing that was out of reach to its current residents meant that
almost all of the Township’s minority residents would have to move to
other municipalities. The due to the redevelopment plan, the Township will
be significantly more white, and the individuals who once lived in the
relatively integrated Township (when looking at it as a whole), will likely
be forced into more segregated areas. This is exactly the problem that the
sponsors of the Fair Housing Act sought to remedy—of course the sponsors

City’s aggressive enforcement of the housing code disproportionately impacted their lowincome tenants, sixty to seventy percent of whom were African American. Per the
landlords, the City’s enforcement of the housing code would force the landlords to either
spend money fixing properties (a cost which would be passed to the mostly minority
tenants) or to take properties off the market (making rental housing less available to
minority tenants). Though the landlords asserted that the disparate impact would harm
their minority tenants, no tenants joined the suit. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit found that
that the landlords had presented a prima facie case of disparate impact. Fair Housing
groups vigorously opposed the petition for certiorari via amicus briefs. Even Walter
Mondale, the Fair Housing Act’s principal sponsor, weighed in, worried that a conservative
and business-friendly Supreme Court might find that disparate impact claims are not
cognizable under the Fair Housing Act, which would, according to Mondale, “de-fang the
Fair Housing Act.” See Kevin Diaz, St. Paul Yanks Housing Fight From High Court, STAR
TRIBUNE,
Feb.
10,
2012,
available
at
http://www.startribune.com/politics/national/139138084.html. Even St. Paul’s Mayor,
Chris Coleman, who had originally pressed the case, feared that under the facts of
Gallagher, the Supreme Court might grant a “[p]yrrhic victory” for the City that would
ultimately weaken the Fair Housing Act. See Gurnon, supra note 3. Bowing to pressure,
the City requested dismissal of its petition in February of 2012. See id.
22
Brief in Opposition for Mt. Holly Gardens Respondents at 3, Twp. of Mount Holly
v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, No. 11–1507 (Sept. 11, 2012).
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of the act were concerned with acts of intentional discrimination, but, as
then Senator Walter Mondale explained, the thrust of the Fair Housing Act
was also aimed at “replac[ing] the ghettos [with] truly integrated and
balanced living patterns.”23
B. History of Residential Segregation
In order to understand why disparate impact analysis is needed to
combat racial segregation, it is important to understand the forces that lead
to the types of racial segregation that are now pervasive in American cities
and towns.
When standing at a subway stop at rush hour in many American
cities, it is often easy to determine the destination of the train by the race of
those who board or disembark. If one sees a white crowd boarding a redline
train in Boston, Massachusetts, one can guess that the train is heading north
to Cambridge, a neighboring city that is majority white.

If the crowd

consists mostly of African Americans and other minorities, one may guess
that the train is heading south towards Dorchester, a predominantly minority
section of Boston.24

Similarly, if one boards a yellow line train in

Washington, DC, one might be able to guess from the racial mix of the
occupants whether the train is heading towards Prince Georges County (a

23
24

114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale).
See
Dorchester
Census
Breakdown,

BOSTON.COM,
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predominately African American county in Maryland) or towards Arlington
(a predominantly white county in Virginia).25
The segregation pervasive in modern American cities is not the
result only of economic disparities between races (as some assume), but
instead stems from systematic public and private efforts to isolate racial
minorities.

Though many urban neighborhoods were relatively racially

integrated in the early part of the twentieth century, by the end of the 1920s,
whites began to utilize a variety of legal tools to exclude African Americans
from white neighborhoods.26

Restrictive covenants in deeds prohibited

whites from selling to African Americans.27

Discriminatory zoning

practices locked African Americans out of particular neighborhoods.28
Discrimination in sales, rental and financing practices was widespread, and
there were few legal tools for challenging such practices.
In the 1930s, these tools of segregation, which had been practiced
mostly on a local or individual level, began to be more strongly reinforced

http://www.boston.com/yourtown/boston/dorchester/news/census_2010/ (last visited Oct.
28, 2013).
25
See Brian Patrick Larkin, Note, The Forty-Year “First Step”: The Fair Housing Act
As an Incomplete Tool for Suburban Integration, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1617, 1617–18
(2007) (“A typical commuter will always know which train will be next to arrive on [the
Metro] platform by the clear racial makeup of those who are waiting—black professionals
will be the overwhelming majority if the Green Line is about to arrive, and white
professionals will dominate the platform if the Yellow Line is next.”).
26
Id.
27
ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION § 2:2
(2012); see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1948) (holding that racially
restrictive covenants are unconstitutional).
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by federal policies that embraced racial discrimination in federally assisted
housing. The housing policies of the New Deal “brought the full force of
the federal government to the aid of institutionalized racial segregation.”29
The Federal Housing Administration, with its new program of guaranteed
mortgages, adopted policies that promoted, and indeed called for, racial
discrimination.30

For example, the Federal Housing Administration’s

guidelines for mortgage appraisals called for protection of neighborhoods
from the “infiltration of inharmonious racial groups.”31 Additionally, an
agency manual explained that neighborhood stability was an important
factor to consider in underwriting policies, indicating that “[a] change in
social or racial occupancy generally contributes to instability and a decline
in values.”32 As homeownership became the principal way for Americans
to build wealth, the Federal Housing Administration systematically worked
to deny this opportunity to African Americans, resulting in a lasting wealth
gap between African Americans and whites, which persists today.33

28

SCHWEMM, supra note 27.
Karl Taeuber, The Contemporary Context of Housing Discrimination, 6 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 339, 341 (1988).
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
John O. Calmor, Symposium, Spatial Equality and the Kerner Commission Report:
A Back-to-The-Future Essay, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1487, 1511 (1993) (quoting CITIZENS’
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A DECENT HOME: A REPORT ON THE CONTINUING FAILURE
OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUNITY 81–82 (1983)
(emphasis omitted)).
33
Brian Gilmore, Home is Where the Hatred Is: A Proposal for a Federal Housing
Administration Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 10 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION,
GENDER & CLASS 249, 253 (2011).
29
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It was not just the federal government that systematically worked to
increase segregation in urban environments; the real estate industry whole
heartedly endorsed the federal government’s views on racial segregation.
Until 1950, for example, the Code of the National Board of Real Estate
Brokers specifically enjoined its members from introducing “members of
any race or nationality” into a neighborhood if such persons “will clearly be
detrimental to property values.”34 Even when edited in response to pressure
from civil rights leaders, the language was changed to thinly veil the clearly
discriminatory intent—the post-1950 provision read “a Realtor should not
be instrumental in introducing into a neighborhood a character or use which
will clearly be detrimental to property values in that neighborhood.”35 The
words “race” and “nationality” were replaced with “character” and “use,”
but the purpose of the provision was clear.
During the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, the reach of public and private
segregationist policies became even broader. Federally subsidized highway
construction and urban renewal programs often reduced the supply of lowcost housing, fragmented neighborhoods, and reinforced the segregated
housing patterns.36 “Blockbusting” – a practice by which real estate agents
facilitated white flight from neighborhoods by creating a scare that African

34

Part III Article 34 of the Code of the National Board of Real Estate Brokers
In 1950, the former Part II, Article 34 became Part I, Article 5 of the Code of the
National Board of Real Estate Brokers.
35
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Americans were moving into the neighborhood – became widespread.37
Banks increased the pace of racial isolation by “redlining” African
American neighborhoods, refusing to lend (or offering much higher interest
rates) in Black communities.38

In fact, from 1960 to 1970, every

geographic region in America experienced an increase in residential
segregation by race.39
To understand why disparate impact analysis is needed in the urban
redevelopment context, it is necessary to understand that the current
conditions in most urban areas are not the result of natural migrations of
communities or individual choice; the conditions are a direct result of
widespread private and public policies with the explicit intent to segregate
communities by race.

i.

Enactment of the Fair Housing Act

The Fair Housing Act came late in the story of housing
segregation—after the core civil rights acts of 1964 and 1965, after the start
of the urban unrest of the mid 1960s, and after a National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders warned that the nation was becoming two

36

Taeuber, supra note 29.
SCHWEMM, supra note 27.
38
Id.
39
Id. (citing SCOTT MCKINNEY & ANN B. SCHNARE, TRENDS IN RESIDENTIAL
SEGREGATION BY RACE: 1960-1980 at 13 (1986)).
37
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societies, separate and unequal.40
From the early 1960s, organizations such as the NAACP and the
National Committee Against Discrimination initiated efforts to push a
housing-related civil rights bill through Congress. As African American
soldiers returned from Vietnam, and were forced into segregated veterans’
homes or were unable to find housing due to discrimination, the media,
including traditionally white media outlets, began to focus on unrest related
to housing.41

At the same time, provoked by profound discrimination,

isolation, and frustration, protests and violence broke out in African
American urban areas throughout the country, most notably starting with
the Watts Riots in 1965, the Division Street Riots of 1966 and the Newark
riots in 1967.
As riots and protests intensified in the late 1960s, President Lyndon
Johnson appointed Illinois governor Otto Kerner, Jr. to head a commission
charged with developing a report on civil unrest in urban areas. The report
concluded that urban civil unrest in African American communities was
caused in large part by white racism—not a surprising conclusion in
hindsight, but at the time the report’s conclusions were revolutionary. The
report indicated that America was “moving towards two societies, one black

40

Taeuber, supra note 29, at 342 (citing U.S. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
CIVIL DISORDERS REPORT (1968))
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and one white—separate and unequal.”42 The report recommended, among
other things, the elimination of barriers to choice in housing and the passage
of a national and enforceable “open housing law.”43
The Kerner Report was released on March 1, 1968, as the Senate
was in the midst of a filibuster blocking Fair Housing legislation
cosponsored by Senators Walter Mondale and Edward Brooke III (who was,
at the time, the only African American member of the Senate).44 With the
release of the Kerner Report, and with the help of Republican Everett
Dirksen, Mondale and Brooke were able to attain a two-thirds Senate vote
for cloture of debate and the legislation was passed by the Senate on March
11, 1968.45
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination on April 4, 1968, served
as a catalyst for the bill’s quick passage through the House with its essential
provisions intact. On April 10th, 1968 the House voted 250-172 to accept
the Senate’s version and the next day, April 11th, 1968, President Johnson

41

See e.g. Kentucky New Era, Pentagon Seeks to End Off-Post Housing Bias,” August
18, 1967.
42
NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N OF CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968) [hereinafter CIVIL DISORDERS
REPORT], available at http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/docs/kerner.pdf; see also
SCHWEMM, supra note 27, § 5:2 n.12 (2012).
43
Id. at 24.
44
Larkin, supra note 25, at 1623.
45
SCHWEMM, supra note 27, § 5:2 (citing 114 CONG. REC. 5992 (1968)).
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signed the bill into law.46
The Fair Housing Act made it illegal to “refuse to sell or rent…or to
refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or
deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex or
national origin.”47 It also made it illegal to “discriminate against any person
in the terms, conditions or privileges of sale or rental” because of that
person’s membership in one of the aforementioned protected classes.
Additionally, the Fair Housing Act included provisions related to
blockbusting, discriminatory advertising, discriminatory lending and other
prohibited acts.48

ii. Housing Segregation Now

Despite the Fair Housing Act’s broad prohibition against
discrimination in housing, forty-five years after the passage of the Fair
Housing Act, housing patterns in the United States continue to be
characterized by high levels of segregation. Demographic trends in the
early 1970s seemed to favor residential integration—African American
income levels were rising, the rate of poverty in African American
communities was declining, and African Americans had begun to join the
46

Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 is commonly referred to, and will be
referred to herein, as the “Fair Housing Act.”
47
Pub L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 83 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012)).
Amendments in 1988 added familial status and handicap status as protected classes.
48
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(f) (2012).
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exodus of families from central cities to suburbs.49

With these trends in

mind, and armed with the newly-enacted Fair Housing Act that prohibited
discrimination, civil rights leaders were optimistic about increasing
residential racial integration.
Despite the fact that the nation seemed poised to enter a more
integrated period in the early 1970s, census data show that from 1970 to
2010, the overall level of residential segregation between African
Americans and whites declined only modestly.50 By 1980, over one third of
African Americans lived in “hyper-segregated,” communities, in which they
were so isolated that they rarely encountered non-African Americans in any
context (i.e. in stores, workplaces, etc.) in their neighborhoods.51 Housing
segregation was no longer limited just who people saw in their
neighborhoods; it also created an environment in which many African
Americans and whites never came into contact in employment, commerce,
schools, or many other facets of daily life. This type of hyper-segregation
has continued into the 21st century, with the 2010 census showing only
modest reductions in residential segregation.52

49

DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 60–61 (Harvard Univ. Press 1993).
50
SCHWEMM, supra note 27.
51
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 49, at 77 (discussing how no other group in the
contemporary United States come close to this level of isolation). Although Hispanics are
considered poor and disadvantaged compared to whites, they do not suffer nearly as much
as African Americans from residential isolation. Id.
52
ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION § 2:1
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While there may have been hope when the Fair Housing Act was
passed that lawsuits addressing individual acts of intentional discrimination
would lead to increased integration or housing opportunities for African
Americans, the persistent levels of segregation indicate that combatting
isolated instances of intentional discrimination alone will not lead to a
reduction in segregation. As discussed in greater detail in the remainder of
this article, more weapons are needed in the fight to increase housing
opportunities for minorities, and among these weapons is the disparate
impact theory.
C. The Development of Fair Housing Act Jurisprudence
In order to understand why the Fair Housing Act supports disparate
impacts claims, as argued in depth in in the remaining portions of this
article, it is first important to understand more about the development of
case law under the Fair Housing Act, particularly as it relates to disparate
impact claims.
The Supreme Court first addressed a disparate impact claim in the
civil rights-litigation context in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,53 an
employment discrimination case, brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Title VII, passed four years prior to the Fair Housing Act,

(2012 Supp.).
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served as a model for the Fair Housing legislation, and is structurally and
linguistically similar in many respects.54
The Griggs case was brought by African American employees,
claiming that Duke Power’s Dan River Plant in Draper, North Carolina
utilized employment practices that had a disproportionate negative impact
on African Americans and therefore violated Title VII.55 In the 1950s,
Duke Power's Dan River plant had a policy that African-Americans were
limited to work in its “Labor Department,” which constituted the lowestpaying positions in the company.56

In fact, the highest paid African

American employee made less than the lowest paid white employee.57 In
1955, the company added the requirement of a high school diploma for its
higher paying jobs.58
After the passage of Title VII in 1964, the company no longer
officially restricted African Americans to the Labor Department, but it
retained the high school diploma requirement, and added the requirement of
an IQ test for non-Labor Department jobs.59 African American applicants
were less likely to hold a high school diploma and averaged lower scores on

53

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
See infra Section II.
55
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426.
56
Id. at 427.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
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the IQ tests;60 thus, they were selected at a much lower rate for these
positions compared to white candidates.
The plaintiffs in Griggs used statistical evidence to show that the IQ
and high school diploma requirements had a disparate impact on African
Americans. In North Carolina in 1960, thirty-four percent of white males
completed high school, while only twelve percent of African American
males did so.61

Further, fifty-eight percent of whites passed Duke’s

standardized IQ tests while only six present of African Americans did so.62
The plaintiffs also showed that whites who had been promoted prior to the
enactment of the requirements and who had neither passed the IQ test nor
obtained a high school diploma performed their jobs as well as those who
did meet the requirements, meaning that the requirements were a poor
measure of job performance.63
In its defense, Duke Power argued that its policies were race-neutral
and that it lacked any intent to discriminate against African Americans.64
Indeed, the company argued that its lack of discriminatory intent was
evidenced by its offer to fund high school training for non-high school

60

See id. at 430 n.6.
Id.
62
Id.
63
See id. at 431–32.
64
Id. at 431.
61
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graduates regardless of race.65

Noting that Title VII prohibits

discrimination “because of” race, the company argued that racial
discrimination requires an intent to treat members of a minority group
differently.66 Without that bad intent, the company asserted, no violation of
Title VII could be found.67
The Supreme Court held that Duke Power’s intent or motivation for
implementing the IQ test and diploma requirements was not the only
relevant issue; instead, the court indicated that “Congress directed the thrust
of [Title VII] to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the
motivation.”68 According to Justice Burger’s majority opinion, practices
and policies that are “neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of
intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of
prior discriminatory employment practices.”69
The Griggs Court did not hold that employers are without defenses
when an employment policy is shown to have a disparate impact on a
protected class. Instead, after the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of
disparate impact, Griggs and its progeny indicate that the burden shifts to
the employer to show that it had a nondiscriminatory business justification

65

Id. at 432.
Id. at 433.
67
See id. at 430 n.6, 433.
68
Id. at 432.
69
Id. at 430.
66
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for its policy or decision70—i.e. in Griggs, the employer could have avoided
liability if it had shown that the IQ test and diploma requirements were
appropriate predictors of job performance. Once the employer puts forth a
business justification for its practice, the plaintiff has the final burden to
show that said justification is unreasonable or is simply a pretext for
discrimination.71
Just one year after the Griggs decision, the Supreme Court issued its
first decision under the Fair Housing Act in an intentional discrimination

70

Id. at 432. Theoretically, defendants could also simply rebut plaintiffs’ prima facie
case without also asserting a business justification defense—i.e. defendants could argue
that the plaintiff is not part of a protected class, or that the evidence plaintiff presented does
not show a disparate impact. See, e.g., Steward v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 954 F.
Supp. 1118, 1126 (E.D. Va. 1996) (rejecting plaintiff’s vague assertions that employer did
not promote minorities). In practice, defendants rarely rely on rebutting the prima facie
case, and instead, they almost always offer a nondiscriminatory business justification.
Accordingly, the court’s task in Title VII litigation is usually determining whether the
business justification is convincing or whether it is simply a pretext for discrimination. See
Norman-Nunnery v. Madison Tech. College, 625 F.3d 422 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining that
plaintiff did not present evidence to demonstrate that defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring is pretext); United States v. City of New York, 637 F.
Supp. 2d 77, 79 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that the New York City Fire Department’s use
of written examinations to select candidates for admission to the New York City Fire
Academy had little relationship to the job of a firefighter); NAACP, Newark Branch v.
Town of Harrison, N.J., 749 F. Supp. 1327, 1341–42 (D.N.J. 1990) (holding that the
residency requirements do not serve “in a significant way” the Town’s legitimate goals to
ensure that employees establish loyalty, have knowledge of the community, and can be
“readily recalled” in emergency situations).
71
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973) (explaining that if the
respondent successfully carried his burden to establish a prima facie case and petitioner
successfully rebutted the case, respondent must be afforded the opportunity to show that
petitioner’s reason for refusing to re-employ was a pretext or discriminatory in its
application on retrial); see also United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 65, 90 (2d Cir. 2011)
(noting that a plaintiff can prove that an employer’s asserted justification is pretext for
discrimination by showing that there is a reasonable nondiscriminatory alternative to the
employment practice, which the defendant failed to utilize).
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case, not a disparate impact case. That case, Trafficante v. Metro Life72 is
important to discussions of disparate impact analysis for two main reasons.
First, in holding that white tenants in an apartment complex who lost the
social benefits of living in an integrated community had standing to sue
under the Fair Housing Act, the Supreme Court emphasized that the Fair
Housing Act is concerned not just with individual acts of discrimination,
but also with the values of integration.73 Second, the Supreme Court noted
that the Fair Housing Act’s language is “broad and inclusive”74 and should
be given “generous construction,”75 two phrases that are important in
understanding why every circuit that has faced disparate impact claims has
held that such claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act.76

72

Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). In this case, petitioners
alleged respondents, owners of a rental property, discriminated against nonwhites on the
basis of race in numerous ways, including “making it known to [nonwhite applicants] that
they would not be welcome at [the rental community], manipulating the waiting lists for
apartments, delaying action on [nonwhite applicants’] applications, and using
discriminatory acceptance standards.” Id. at 207–08.
73
Id. at 212 (“We can give vitality to § 810(a) only by a generous construction which
gives standing to sue to all in the same housing unit who are injured by racial
discrimination in the management of those facilities within the coverage of the statute.”).
74
Id. at 209.
75
Id. at 212.
76
City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731 (1995) (explaining that
its analysis was “mindful of the Act’s stated policy” and “precedent recognizing the FHA’s
‘broad and inclusive’ compass, and therefore according a ‘generous construction’ to the
Act’s complaint-filing provision.”); Graoch Assocs. #33, L.P. v. Louisville/Jefferson
County Metro Human Relations Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 372 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding
persuasive that the broad and remedial purpose of Title VII is parallel with Title VIII as
articulated by Griggs and Trafficante); see also Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d
246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he FHA must be given a ‘generous construction’ to carry out
a ‘policy that Congress considered to be of the highest priority.’”); Matarese v. Archstone
Pentagon City, 795 F. Supp. 2d 402, 430 (E.D. Va. 2011) (quoting People Helpers, Inc. v.
City of Richmond, 789 F. Supp. 725, 731 (E.D. Va. 1992) (“The FHA is ‘broad and
inclusive’ in protecting against conduct which interferes with fair housing rights and is
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Three years after the Griggs decision, the Eighth Circuit was the
first to hear a disparate impact case under the Fair Housing Act—United
States v. City of Black Jack.77
In City of Black Jack, a municipal zoning ordinance that prohibited
construction of any new multifamily dwellings was challenged on the
grounds that it would have a disparate impact on minorities, in violation of
the Fair Housing Act. At the time, Black Jack, Missouri’s demographic
makeup was almost completely white, with an African American population
of between one and two percent.78 St. Louis, which abutted the city of
Black Jack, was approximately forty percent African American.

The

plaintiffs argued that Black Jack’s ordinance prohibiting multifamily
housing, while neutral on its face, would serve to preclude African
Americans, many of whom were seeking to escape overcrowded conditions
in St. Louis, from moving into Black Jack.79
While the facts of the case seemed to support an inference of
intentional discrimination,80 the Eighth Circuit relied on Equal Protection

subject to generous construction.”), aff’d in part and vacated in part, Matarese v.
Archstone Cmtys., LLC, 468 Fed. Appx. 283 (4th Cir. 2012).
77
United States v. City of Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).
78
Id. at 1183; see also Eric W.M. Bain, Note, Another Missed Opportunity to Fix
Discrimination in Discrimination Law, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1434, 1444 (2012).
79
See City of Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d at 1186.
80
See generally id. at 1182–84 (explaining that the city ordinance prohibited
construction of any new multi-family dwellings and “made present ones nonconforming
uses” when the City of Black Jack was “virtually all white”).
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principles and disparate impact-oriented analogies to Griggs to hold that the
zoning ordinance in question resulted in an impermissible disparate impact
on African Americans. The Court held that the ordinance in question would
“contribute to the perpetuation of segregation in a community which was
[ninety-nine] percent white,” and therefore that it served to “den[y] persons
housing on the basis of race, in violation of 3604(a).”81
In 1977, two years after the City of Jack Black decision, the Seventh
Circuit ruled on a somewhat similar exclusionary zoning case in
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights.
In that case, a housing developer sought rezoning of a 15-acre parcel of land
in the Village of Arlington Heights, a suburb of Chicago, in order to
construct a multi-family development. The development was to contain
approximately 290 units, 90 of which would be designated for families with
low or moderate incomes, and would have required the Village of Arlington
Heights to change the parcel from a single-family zoning designation to a
multi-family zoning designation. The Village of Arlington Heights denied
the request, and the developer and other plaintiffs brought a suit alleging
violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment and of the
Fair Housing Act.
The trial court in Arlington Heights held that the municipality was
81

Id. at 1186, 1188.
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not motivated by racial animus when it denied the rezoning, but rather by a
desire to protect property values.82 Therefore, the trial court reasoned, there
was no violation of any anti-discrimination law.83
The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the lower court’s search
into Arlington Height’s motivation was not the proper inquiry; instead, it
assessed the disparate impact on minorities in light of “its historical context
and ultimate effect.”84 Per the 1970 census, the Village’s population was
64,000, only 27 of whom were African American.85 The Seventh Circuit
found that the Village had not made “even a small contribution toward
eliminating the pervasive problem of segregated housing,” and it therefore
held that the Village’s rejection of the rezoning request had “racially
discriminatory effects” and could be upheld “only if it were shown that a
compelling public interest necessitated the decision.”86 Looking only to
14th Amendment reasoning, the court held that the desire to protect property
values was not a “compelling public interest” and therefore refusal to

82

Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208, 211 (N.D.
Ill. 1974).
83
See id.
84
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409, 413 (7th Cir.
1975) [hereinafter Arlington Heights I], rev’d, Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
85
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION
(1970); see also David L. Callies & Clifford L. Weaver, The Arlington Heights Case: The
Exclusion of Exclusionary Zoning Challenges, 2 REAL ESTATE ISSUES 22, 23 (Summer
1977).
86
Arlington Heights I, 517 F.2d at 415.
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rezone violated the 14th Amendment.87
The Supreme Court did not agree with the Seventh Circuit’s 14th
Amendment reasoning. Relying primarily on its decision in Washington v.
Davis,88 decided after the Seventh Circuit ruling, but before Supreme Court
oral arguments in Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court indicated that
governmental action would not be held unconstitutional solely because it
resulted in a racially disproportionate impact.

“Proof of racially

discriminatory intent,” the Court held, “is required to show a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause.”89

Because the Seventh Circuit had only

considered the constitutional question, and not the Fair Housing question,
the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit to determine
whether the disparate impact caused by Village’s denial of the rezoning
request violated the Fair Housing Act.90
Relying upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Griggs, upon remand,
the Seventh Circuit held that a finding of intent is not a prerequisite to a
finding of discrimination under the Fair Housing Act.91

In short, the

Seventh Circuit ruled, in what has become known as “Arlington II,” that “at
least under some circumstances a violation of [the Fair Housing Act] can be

87

Id.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
90
Id. at 271.
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Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1289 (7th
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established by a showing of discriminatory effect without a showing of
discriminatory intent.”92

The Seventh Circuit developed a four-prong

balancing test for determining whether a disparate impact claim should be
cognizable under the Fair Housing Act, which has been used in three other
circuits.93
In the years following the City of Black Jack and Arlington Heights
decisions, nine more circuits confronted disparate impact cases under the
Fair Housing Act, and each found disparate impact claims to be
cognizable.94

The circuits developed methods for evaluating disparate

impact claims that varied slightly from each other in language and structure,
but not in focus (with the exception, perhaps, of the Arlington II “four
factor test” which may require some showing of intentionality). 95

Cir. 1977).
92
Id. at 1290.
93
Id. The 7th Circuit determined that there were four “critical factors” in determining
what circumstances produce a discriminatory impact. First, the strength of the plaintiff’s
showing of discriminatory effect.
Second, whether there is some evidence of
discriminatory intent, even if not enough to satisfy the constitutional standard of
Washington v. Davis. Third, what the defendant’s interest is in taking the action which
prompted the suit. Fourth, whether the plaintiff seeks to “compel the defendant to
affirmatively provide housing for members of minority groups or merely to restrain the
defendant from interfering with individual property owners who wish to provide such
housing.” Id.
94
See sources cited supra note 4.
95
Three slightly different tests have emerged. (1) A “balance-of the factors test,” (used
in the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits, and originally proposed in Arlington
Heights II) asks courts to weigh the strength of plaintiff’s showing of discriminatory effect;
evidence of discriminatory intent; defendant’s interest in taking action complained of; and,
whether plaintiff seeks to compel the defendant to affirmatively provide housing for
protected class or to restrain defendant “from interfering with individual property owners
who wish to provide housing.” (2) A “burden-shifting analysis,” (used in the Third, Eight
and Ninth Circuits), which starts with the plaintiff making a prima facie case of disparate
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Despite over forty years of jurisprudence recognizing the disparate
impact theory under the Fair Housing Act, opponents of such recognition
have contended, intermittently, that the Fair Housing Act does not support
such claims or that such claims require actors to engage in a type of raceconscious thinking that violates the Equal Protection principles of the 14th
Amendment.96 The call for the end of disparate impact analysis under the
Fair Housing Act became more pronounced during the debates about the
1988 amendments to the Act (and Congress failed to either expressly ratify
disparate impact analysis by including it in the amendments or to expressly
disavow it).97

When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in disparate

impact by showing that (i) he or she is a member of a protected class and (ii) that the
policy, action or decision in question has a significant disparate impact on members of that
protected class. The burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the action in
question has a manifest relationship to a non-discriminatory objective and that the policy or
decision is necessary to the achievement of this objective (this is similar to the “business
necessity” language in Title VII jurisprudence). Even if a defendant is able to meet its
justification burden, the plaintiff may still prevail if he or she shows that a viable
alternative means is available to achieve the policy objective without a discriminatory
effect. And finally, (3) a “hybrid test” (used in the First and Second Circuits), which
combines the two approaches described above. See Bain, supra note 78, at 1446 nn.83–85;
see also Ann B. Lever & Todd Espinosa, A Tale of Two Fair Housing Disparate-Impact
Cases, 15 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 257, 258 (2006).
96
Rosenthal, at 2179
97
Anti-disparate impact advocates point out that Congress had the opportunity to
specifically embrace disparate impact analysis as part of the 1988 amendments and chose
not to do so; proponents of disparate impact, of course, make the opposite claim, arguing
that, at the time the 1988 amendments were being discussed, Congress was aware that all
nine Courts of Appeal that had addressed the issue at that time had found that disparate
impact claims were cognizable under the Fair Housing Act. Accordingly, per this
argument, Congressional silence regarding disparate impact constituted a tacit approval of
the status quo. The Supreme Court, for its part, seems reluctant to infer anything from
Congressional silence. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 106 (2007)
(“Ordinarily, we resist reading congressional intent into congressional inaction.”); on the
other hand, see Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174-75 (2009)
(refusing to apply Title VII’s mixed motive burden-shifting framework to the ADEA
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impact cases in the 2011-2012 term, and then again in the 2013-2014 term,
the conversation about disparate impact theory under the Fair Housing Act
in academic and advocacy circles has evolved from a simmer to a boil.

II. DISPARATE IMPACT—STARTING WITH THE TEXT OF THE FAIR
HOUSING ACT

With two disparate impact cases in front of the Supreme Court in
three years, there has been renewed attention directed at the disparate
impact theory, especially in the context of challenges to urban renewal
plans that have a disparate impact on minorities. Some advocates have
argued that, unlike Title VII and the ADEA, the text of the Fair Housing
Act does not support disparate impact claims.98
To make this case, opponents of disparate impact analysis point to
the fact that, unlike Title VII and the ADEA, the Fair Housing Act does not

because when Congress considered the two statutes simultaneously in 1991, it amended
Title VII to include a mixed motive framework while it did not include such a provision in
its amendments to the ADEA.); Gross, however, applied to statutes being amended
simultaneously. In the case of the Fair Housing Act, Congress simply neglected to amend
it at the time it amended Title VII. See also Robert G. Schwemm and Sara K. Pratt,
Disparate Impact under the Fair Housing Act: A Proposed Approach, NAT’L FAIR HOUS.
ALLIANCE
12
(Dec.
1,
2009),
http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/Portals/33/DISPARATE%20IMPACT%20ANALYSIS
%20FINAL.pdf.
98
See Kirk D. Jensen & Jeffrey P. Naimon, The Fair Housing Act, Disparate Impact
Claims, and Magner v. Gallagher: An Opportunity to Return to the Primacy of the
Statutory Text, 129 BANKING L.J. 99, 102-109 (2012); see Petitioners’ Opening Brief at
17–26, Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., No. 11–1507
(Aug. 26, 2013); see also Brief for the Petitioners at 20–29, Magner v. Gallagher, No. 10–
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contain the word “affect.” From this, such advocates infer, congress meant
for Title VII and the ADEA, but not the Fair Housing Act, to govern actions
that have a discriminatory effects.
Linguistically and structurally, however, the Fair Housing Act has as
much in common with Title VII and the ADEA as possible, given that the
Fair Housing Act covers housing and the other two acts apply to
employment.

A portion of each act follows, with relevant provisions

highlighted:

1032 (Dec. 22, 2011).
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TITLE VII
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way, which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.99
ADEA
It shall be unlawful for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age;100
FAIR HOUSING ACT
It shall be unlawful
(a) to refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to
negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or
national origin.
(b) to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or
rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection
therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.101

99

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1)–(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
101
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(b) (2012) (emphasis added).

100
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Advocates who argue that the disparate impact standard should
apply to Title VII and the ADEA matters and not to Fair Housing matters
point energetically to the fact that Title VII and the ADEA both contain the
word “affect,” as shown in bold above (and, indeed, via amendment, Title
VII explicitly deals with disparate impact cases). These advocates have
myopically focused on the absence of the single word “affect” in the Fair
Housing Act without noting the similar or identical language in the key
substantive language in each Act.
Each Act contains language that focuses on the motivations of the
actor. Title VII and the ADEA make it illegal to “fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual”102 based on his or her membership in a protected
class. Similarly, the Fair Housing Act makes it illegal to “refuse to sell or
rent” based on membership in a protected class. This language in all three
acts focuses on the motivation of the actor. The question posed by this
language is: was the actor’s decision animated by the applicant’s race, sex,
age, national origin, etc.?
In contrast, each act also contains language that focuses on the
impacts of potentially neutral decisions on protected classes, as opposed to
an actor’s motivations. In the case of Title VII and the ADEA this language
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appears in subparagraph (2) and indicates that it is illegal to take actions
that would “deprive or tend to deprive” an individual of employment
opportunities or “otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee”
because of membership in a protected class.103 Similarly, in subparagraph
(1), the Fair Housing Act makes it illegal to “make unavailable or deny” a
dwelling because of membership in a protected class.104 Both of these
clauses focus not on the motivations of an actor, but instead on the potential
discriminatory impacts of actions. While “affects” language in Title VII
and the ADEA may be more explicit than the “otherwise make unavailable
or deny” language in the Fair Housing Act, but the “otherwise make
unavailable or deny” language, at the very least, can be logically construed
to support the notion that the Fair Housing Act is concerned with claims
where the effect of the actions, as opposed to the intent of the actor, is
central.
Advocates who argue that, without the “adversely affects” language,
disparate impact claims simply cannot be cognizable under the Fair
Housing Act fail to note that the inclusion of the “adversely affects” phrase
simply would not make sense in the housing context—e.g. the language of
the Fair Housing Act would have been strange indeed if Congress had made

102

29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1)–(2) (2012) (emphasis added); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2)
(emphasis added).
103

IN DEFENSE OF DISPARATE IMPACT

40

it illegal to “adversely affect” an individual’s “status” as a potential
homeowner or renter. Instead, it is the Fair Housing Act’s prohibition
against actions that would “otherwise make unavailable or deny” housing
opportunities that gives a textual basis for disparate impact claims under the
Fair Housing Act. Actions that have a disparate impact on minorities often
“make unavailable or deny” housing opportunities because of race, and such
actions are prohibited by the language of the Act.
If you think that this debate about the linguistic similarities and
differences seems strained, I would have to agree. My argument here is that
reading disparate impact analysis into Title VII and the ADEA simply
because those statutes contain the word “affect” while the Fair Housing Act
omits that word in favor of more descriptive language (i.e. using the
“otherwise make unavailable or deny” language), is the most strained
reading possible of the Acts. Indeed, no court has held that disparate impact
claims must be based on the “adversely affect” phrase alone.
As a final note about the text, I turn to the provision that animated
many decisions in early disparate impact cases under the Fair Housing Act:
the statement of purpose contained at the beginning of the Act.

The

statement of purpose reads as follows: “It is the policy of the United States
to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the
104

42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(b) (2012).
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United States.”105 Given the remedial purposes of the Fair Housing Act,
courts have uniformly held that it is to be “given broad and liberal
construction,”106
III. DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY IS NOT ONLY ANOTHER WAY
TO SHOW INTENT; IT IS A SEPARATE COGNIZABLE THEORY
A. Disparate Impact Evidence Used to Prove Intentional
Discrimination
Even those who accept that, as discussed above, the text of the Fair
Housing Act allows for disparate impact theory are sometimes confused
about how disparate impact theory comes into play in Fair Housing cases,
particularly in the urban redevelopment context.107 The confusion stems, in
part, from the fact that disparate-impact evidence can be properly used to
105

Id. § 3601.
Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 388 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Woods-Drake v.
Lundy, 667 F.2d 1198, 1201 (5th Cir. 1982)) (quoting Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972)).
107
The Third Circuit criticized the district court decision in Mt. Holly for conflating
the disparate treatment and disparate impact analyses. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in
Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 383 (3d Cir. 2011). At times, however,
the Third Circuit fell into the same trap. See id. (“[E]stablishment of a prima facie case by
itself is not enough to establish liability under the FHA. It simply results in a more
searching inquiry into the defendant’s motivations . . . .”). Though it got to the right result
– that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act – the Third
Circuit added ‘disparate treatment language’ into its decision. In a disparate impact case,
the “more searching inquiry” should not be into the motivations of the defendant, but rather
into whether there were less discriminatory alternatives that the defendant failed to take.
See Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved with Good Intentions?:
Stuck on State of Mind in Antidiscrimination Law, 42 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1141, 1142
(2007) (noting generally that even when purporting to utilize disparate impact theory,
courts and litigants often focus on the “state of mind” of decision-makers, blending
disparate treatment analysis with disparate impact analysis. “Litigants mix and match
disparate treatment and disparate impact allegations, defenses, and burdens of proof like
spring sportswear.”).
106
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help prove disparate treatment claims.108 It may help to understand the
difference between disparate impact and disparate treatment claims through
the lens of a few examples.
Consider a recent case from St. Bernard Parish in Louisiana. In that
lawsuit, litigants claimed, among other things, that the Parish intended109 to
restrict African Americans from moving into the Parish after Hurricane
Katrina—a classic disparate treatment claim.110 According to the plaintiffs
in the case, to accomplish its discriminatory goal of keeping African
Americans out, the Parish enacted a series of discriminatory ordinances,
including one that restricted property owners in the Parish (who were
mostly white) to renting only to their own blood relatives.111 The ordinance
was neutral of its face –that is, it treated African American and white
property owners identically. But the litigants had strong direct evidence of
108

Id. 1189–91 (“[T]he possible universe of disparate impact cases includes both those
cases in which discriminatory intent is causing the impact and those in which
discriminatory intent is having no role in the outcome.”); see also Joseph A. Seiner,
Disentangling Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment: Adapting the Canadian
Approach, 25 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 95, 97 (2006)
109
The case involved disparate treatment and disparate impact claims, though, for the
purposes of this discussion, I address the disparate treatment claims.
110
Marlene Theberge, Fair Housing Center announces $900,000 settlement agreement
with St. Bernard Parish; pleased with settlement between United States and Parish,
GREATER NEW ORLEANS FAIR HOUS. ACTION CTR. (May 10, 2013),
http://www.gnofairhousing.org/2013/05/10/fair-housing-center-announces-900000settlement-agreement-with-st-bernard-parish-pleased-with-settlement-between-unitedstates-and-parish/.
111
The series of actions intended to restrict African Americans from renting within the
Parish also included passing an ordinance that required single-family homeowners in
residential zones to obtain permits before they could rent their properties, revising the
zoning code to greatly reduce the amount of property available for multifamily housing,
and perhaps most obviously discriminatory, passing the “blood relative” ordinance
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intentional discrimination, including the fact that Craig Taffaro, the member
of the Parish Council who drafted and sponsored the blood-relative
ordinance, admitted that the goal of the ordinance was “to maintain the
demographics,” which, at the time at the time of Hurricane Katrina, was
86.4% white.112 Additionally, Parish Councilpersons voting against the
ordinance indicated that the Parish Council’s goal was to “block the blacks
from living in these areas.”113
In addition to their direct evidence of intentional discrimination, the
plaintiffs in the St. Bernard Parish case also had strong circumstantial
evidence of intentional discrimination, among which was evidence that the
ordinance would have a disparate impact on African Americans, who, at the
time, were seeking rental housing in the New Orleans area at much greater
rates than whites, and who would be largely unable to secure rental housing
in Saint Bernard Parish under the blood-relative ordinance. It was clear that
the decision-makers were aware of this disparate impact; thus, if the case
had gone forward, the disparate impact evidence could have been used to
prove a disparate treatment claim.114

mentioned above. See Seicshnaydre, supra note 107, at 1189–90.
112
See Seicshnaydre, supra note 107, at 1189 & n.257; see also Sabrina Canfield, USA
Sees Racial Discrimination in New Orleans, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Feb. 2, 2012),
http://www.courthousenews.com/2012/02/02/4356
6.htm;
see
also
Time
Runs
Out
For
St.
Bernard
Parish,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/30/opinion/30wed3.html.
113
Seicshnaydre, supra note 107, at 1189 & n.258.
114
Some argue that disparate impact theory is primarily a tool for litigants to root out
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B. Disparate Impact As a Stand-Alone Claim—The Key to Disparate
Impact Analysis

Disparate impact evidence is not just a way to show that an actor
had a discriminatory intent when that intent is difficult to prove (though it
certainly can be used that way)—the thrust of this article and the key to the
recently-settled Mt. Holly case (and, presumably, the next disparate impact
case to reach the Supreme Court) is an argument that disparate impact
evidence can support independent claims under the Fair Housing Act, even
when there was no discernible intent to discriminate.

As explained in

greater detail in Section IV, the use of disparate impact as a stand-alone
claim is, perhaps, most important in urban redevelopment cases, where the
intent of municipal actors often has little to do with whether a municipal
decision will further segregation or limit housing opportunities for the very
communities the Fair Housing Act seeks to protect.
Another example, this time involving a disparate impact claim,
might prove useful. Imagine that a municipality seeks to redevelop at least
one of its many blighted neighborhoods. To accomplish its redevelopment

hard-to-prove intentional discrimination, and it may have been utilized this way in some
portions of the St. Bernard litigation. Certainly, as explained herein evidence of a disparate
impact can be used to shore up a disparate treatment claim–e.g. evidence that a policy
disproportionately impacts minorities and that the decision-makers knew of such the
disproportionate impact could lead a fact finder to infer that the decision-maker intended
the disparate result because of racial animus. But disparate impact claims can and should
stand on their own. For a more detailed analysis of some theorists’ argument that disparate
impact analysis is simply an “evidentiary dragnet” aimed at catching intentional
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goal, the municipality plans to purchase or take properties, destroy all
existing structures, and rebuild the community as a mixed-income
development (much as it did in the Mt. Holly case). No matter which
blighted neighborhood the municipality chooses, it is likely that many of the
current residents will be unable to afford to return to the neighborhood once
it is redeveloped. Due to past government-sanctioned discrimination, nowoutlawed restrictive covenants, and perhaps some element of personal
preference, one of the blighted neighborhoods is mostly African American
while another one of the blighted neighborhoods is mostly white. In both of
the neighborhoods on the table for redevelopment, the current residents are
largely opposed to the plans. The municipality chooses to redevelop, and
hence dismantle, the African American neighborhood, not because the
decision-makers harbor a racist intent, but because the community meetings
on the matter took place in the evenings, at a time when minorities were less
able to attend than whites, and, as a result, slightly fewer minorities showed
up to object to the redevelopment than their white neighbors.
This is an example of a case that does not involve any intent to
discriminate; the municipality made its decision based on a neutral factor –
the number of residents voicing opposition to the project – but its effect will
be disproportionately born by African Americans, most of who will have to

discrimination that otherwise might be missed. See id. at 1189.
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leave the municipality, which will increase racial segregation.

Here,

evidence of disparate impact would not be used to buttress a claim for
intentional discrimination, but instead would stand on its own under the Fair
Housing Act. If the Fair Housing Act is to have any chance at succeeding
at its drafters’ goal of replacing the ghetto with “truly integrated and
balanced living patterns,”115 the mere fact that an action has a disparate
impact on a protected class must result in a cognizable claim under the Fair
Housing Act.116
IV. DISPARATE IMPACT ANALYSIS IS NEEDED TO ENSURE THAT
URBAN REDEVELOPMENT DECISIONS DO NOT UNDERMINE THE
GOALS OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT

The underlying facts of disparate impact cases in the urban
redevelopment context make it plain that these types of cases, even more
than the employment discrimination cases to which they are analogized, cry
out for disparate impact analysis for three main reasons: First, urban
redevelopment decisions, unlike employment decisions, are often made
through a diffuse and complicated process where intent is neither relevant to
115

114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale).
Recall that the question before the Supreme Court in the Gallagher and Mt. Holly
cases was simply whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing
Act. If found cognizable, that certainly does not determine the merits of individual cases—
courts will still have to engage in the burden shifting analysis described in Griggs and other
Title VII and Fair Housing cases (and now formalized in a HUD rule). The question before
the Court in Gallagher and Mt. Holly was simply whether plaintiffs who lose housing
opportunities due to an action that has a disparate impact on minorities may walk through
the courthouse doors—as explained elsewhere in this article, such plaintiffs must then
shoulder a heavy evidentiary burden.
116
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whether discrimination occurred nor possible to discern. Second, widely
accepted social science research tells us that much racism occurs with no
discriminatory intent at all.117 Given the protracted manner in which urban
redevelopment decisions are made, it is especially possible that unconscious
bias could influence the outcome. Finally, urban redevelopment decisions
are among the main forces shaping our cities right now; the ills of
segregation will not be remedied by simply thwarting the actions of
individual intentional discriminators.
A. Intent Is Not Relevant (And Can Be Impossible to Discern) When
Decisions Are Made Via a Diffuse Process

In the employment context (to which Fair Housing Act cases are
frequently compared) decisions are often linear and made by individuals
acting alone—a supervisor, for example, may institute a policy that
disadvantages minorities or a Human Resources manager may create a test
that filters out African American applicants. In these cases, while it may be
challenging to prove intent, especially when individuals take pains to mask
it, a discriminatory intent can often be found at the root of a discriminatory

117

See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117
HARV. L. REV. 493, 506–07, 532–33 (2003) (discussing the Supreme Court’s endorsement
of disparate impact theory since 1971); see also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317
(1987); Destiny Peery, Note & Comment, The Colorblind Ideal in A Race-Conscious
Reality: The Case for A New Legal Ideal for Race Relations, 6 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y
473, 481 (2011).
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result.118 In contrast, decisions related to housing, especially in the urban
redevelopment context, are often made by diffuse municipal bodies in
which individuals and groups have differing and even conflicting
motivations, and where a discriminatory intent may not be present, even
where a discriminatory result ensues.
Looking

more

closely

at

how

decisions

regarding

urban

redevelopment are made, it is easy to see how a linear or definable “intent”
may be absent in many urban redevelopment or land use decisions. Unlike
in the employment context, in the urban redevelopment context, decisions
are not made by one individual or entity; instead, decisions are made via a
complex democratic process involving many competing constituencies. It
is possible that a planning committee may be concerned with traffic, the
environmental review board may be concerned with impacts on wildlife, a
mayor may be concerned with street safety, and residents may be concerned
with density. The process to create a redevelopment plan may take years
and involve tens or hundreds of individual, each with different agendas. But
if the result of the decision-making process is a plan that will have a
substantial segregating impact or if a project would foreclose housing
118

See generally Selmi, supra note 6, at 776–81 (“Because subtle discrimination is not
fueled by a conscious motive or any express animus, there has been a struggle in the
literature to determine whether existing proof structures can accommodate the changed
nature of discrimination, and some scholars have proposed new proof structures that
typically fuse elements of intent and impact.”). As explained in Section II of this article,
disparate impact evidence could be utilized to prove a disparate treatment claim, such as
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opportunities to a protected class, the Fair Housing Act should (and, under
the precedent in eleven circuits, does) require municipalities to consider
alternatives that would have a less discriminatory impact.119
Recent events, such as Hurricane Katrina, display how diffuse
decision-making may result in disparate and discriminatory impacts, even
when there is no intent to discriminate.120 As one scholar asks “[d]oes it
matter that no one intended for a disproportionate number of poor persons
of color to be left behind when Hurricane Katrina hit? . . . Does it matter
that no one intended for those without the resources to leave to be now
unable to find the resources to return?”121 Even if those individuals and
entities making decisions have no discriminatory intent at all, shouldn’t the
Fair Housing Act prevent New Orleans from being reconstructed as a city
that is largely unavailable to African American residents? Surely this is the
type of situation that the Fair Housing Act should address given that it
makes it illegal not just to “discriminate” on the basis of race, but also to

the one described in this example.
119
It is important to point out that the issue in the Gallagher and Mt. Holly cases is not
whether every litigant who can show that a municipal decision has a disparate impact on
minorities should win his or her case; the issue is only whether such cases are cognizable
under the Fair Housing Act. If they are, as 11 circuits have held, then plaintiffs must still
show that there was a less discriminatory manner by which the municipality could have
accomplished its legitimate goals and that the municipality failed to pursue that less
discriminatory alternative.
120
As discussed in Section IV of this article, many municipalities behaved in ways that
were intentionally discriminatory after Hurricane Katrina; others, however, passed
ordinances and took actions that could not be traced to a discriminatory intent but still had
a discriminatory effect.
121
Seicshnaydre, supra note 107, at 1188.

IN DEFENSE OF DISPARATE IMPACT

50

“otherwise make unavailable or deny” housing because of race.
Other post-Katrina ordinances further highlight the fact that intent
cannot be the only inquiry in Fair Housing matters, because of the diffuse
and multi-layered manner in which housing-related decisions come into
being. Shortly after the storm, the Pointe Coupee Parish, near New Orleans,
adopted an ordinance reading:

“RESOLVED, that trailer parks of

temporary housing for displaced evacuees of Hurricane Katrina and Rita not
be created by FEMA in Point Coupee Parish.”122 Perhaps the
councilmembers who passed the ordinance were concerned with traffic,
aesthetics, or increased enrollment in schools. Perhaps they were retaliating
against FEMA, an agency that, after Hurricane Katrina, was viewed largely
bas ineffective, at best, and intentionally negligent, at worst. Perhaps the
intents of the individuals shifted over time, as the ordinance made its way
through the democratic process. But regardless of intent, if the council’s
action served to lock African American residents out of the Parish or
increase segregation in the area, surely those residents must be able to
pursue a claim under the Fair Housing Act.123 As one author asks, if it were

122

See id. at 1190 & n.262; see also Pointe Coupee Parish, La., Resolution on
Temporary Housing in Pointe Coupee Parish (Nov. 8, 2005).
123
Note that plaintiffs in such a case might not prevail under the Fair Housing Act. As
discussed in throughout this article, in most circuits prior to the recent HUD rule, and
presumably in all circuits after the HUD rule, disparate impact analysis allows plaintiffs to
establish a prima facie case, after which defendants have an opportunity to show that the
action in question was taken in pursuit of a legitimate objective. The burden then shifts
back to the plaintiff to show that there was a less discriminatory alternative, which the
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established that the majority of those displaced persons in need of housing
were persons of color and that the ordinance would serve to exclude such
people from Pointe Coupee Parish, does it matter what went on the minds of
the decision-makers?124
Looking at the Mt. Holly case – the Fair Housing case granted
certiorari by the Supreme Court in the 2012-2013 term – it is easy to see
how an intent to discriminate can be divorced from whether a municipal
decision has an impact that would undermine the purposes of the Fair
Housing Act.

As noted above, in that case, the municipality spent a

considerable amount of time studying the Gardens neighborhood before
declaring it “blighted” and instituting a redevelopment plan that would wipe
the existing neighborhood off the map and scatter most of the Townships
minority residents to already segregated areas.125 There is no evidence that
any of the many influencers and decision makers had an intent to increase
racial isolation or further segregation—no individual councilmember made
a racist remark, no document revealed racial animus, and no paper trail
created an inference of discriminatory intent.
Unlike in the employment context (where decisions are usually
made through a linear and hierarchical system), no one individual or body

plaintiff failed to pursue.
124
Seicshnaydre, supra note 107, at 1190.
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was entirely responsible for the multitude of decisions that led to the
redevelopment plans in Mt. Holly. The developer worked with architects,
banks and city planners to devise a redevelopment plan; the planning
department, environmental review board, traffic department and other
committees likely weighed in; public input was taken into consideration; the
plan was revised numerous times over the course of years, etc. With such a
diffuse and protracted process, it would be impossible to ascertain a specific
intent to discriminate, and indeed such intent may not exist. But, if the
result of such a decision-making process fuels segregation, shouldn’t such a
claim be cognizable under the Fair Housing Act?
As stated elsewhere in this article, the question before the Supreme
Court in the Gallagher case and the Mt. Holly case is not whether the
plaintiffs should win on the merits, but simply whether they may have their
day in court. If disparate impact claims are found to be cognizable under
the Fair Housing Act, then courts engage in the burden shifting analysis first
outlined in Griggs and then followed in most Fair Housing cases.126 At its
core, the burden shifting analysis simply asks courts to determine whether
there was another less discriminatory way for the defendant to accomplish
125

Brief for Mt. Holly Gardens Respondents at 8–9, Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly
Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., No. 11-1507 (Oct. 21, 2013).
126
As previously the majority of circuits utilize a burden-shifting paradigm, while
some use a four-factor test. Presumably, since the codification of the recent HUD Rule
regarding disparate impact, all circuits will utilize the burden shifting mechanism described
therein.
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If another path exists for
legitimate

non-discriminatory

redevelopment goals, which would have a less damaging impact on the
communities that the Fair Housing Act intends to protect, then, under the
current Fair Housing Act jurisprudence, the municipality could be forced to
pursue that alternate path—a result that seems in line with both the Fair
Housing Act, and, presumably (assuming that it had no intent to
discriminate), the general will of the municipality at issue.
Requiring a showing of intent under the Fair Housing Act
(something the Supreme Court seems poised to do) would ignore the basic
facts of housing discrimination cases—cases in which, because of the
diffuse decision-making process at issue, intent is neither discernible nor
relevant to the question of whether discrimination occurred.
B. Social Science Tells Us That Intent is Not A Critical Element of
Discrimination
Requiring proof of discriminatory intent as a prerequisite to a Fair
Housing Act claim “ignores much of what [is understood] about how the
human mind works.”127 Racial bias, we know from multiple social science
studies, is so ingrained in our culture that acting on such bias can rarely be

127

Lawrence, supra note 117, at 323. The author is writing about the Equal Protection
Clause and not the Fair Housing Act, yet he suggests that if the symbol has cultural
connotations or implications, it can be assumed it is demonstrative of unconscious racist
intent.
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called intentional.128

Indeed, as one scholar put it, “insisting that a

blameworthy perpetrator be found before the existence of racial
discrimination can be acknowledged...creates an imaginary world” which
serves to perpetuate discrimination by failing to even acknowledge its
presence.129
One judge, writing about the increased focus on intent in the
employment discrimination context, described the “imaginary world” that a
requirement of intent would create as follows:
It is as if the bench is saying: Discrimination is
over. The market is bias-free . . . . The complex
phenomenon that is discrimination can be reduced to a
simple paradigm of the errant discriminator or the
explicitly biased policy, a paradigm that rarely
matches the reality of twenty-first-century life.130
Another scholar put it this way:
The urban oppression now experienced by so
many blacks is neither natural nor inevitable. In
assessing responsibility, little is gained by searching
out individual perpetrators.
A regime sustains
subordination
through
generating
“devices,
institutions, and circumstances that impose burdens or
constraints on the target group without resort to
repeated or individualized discriminatory actions.”131

128

See id. at 317; Primus, supra note 117, at 532–33; Peery, supra note 3, at 481.
Lawrence, supra note 117, at 324–25.
130
Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 111–112 (2012)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
131
Calmor, supra note 32, at 1508 (quoting Eric Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past
129
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Even where there is a single decision-maker (as opposed to the
diffuse process described above), social science tells us that discrimination
can occur, and indeed more often than not does occur, without intent.
Where there are multiple decision-makers, working towards consensus
through a lengthy and protracted urban redevelopment process, the
likelihood that implicit bias will play a role in the outcome is only
increased.
Municipal bodies, such as planning boards, exist to make decisions
that impact large groups of people. The conscious intent of the body to, for
example, ease traffic congestion in a particular area might be entirely
divorced from whether the outcome has a discriminatory impact due to the
effects of implicit bias.

If municipal leaders, trying to ease traffic

congestion in a white neighborhood, decide to construct a highway through
the area’s only African American neighborhood, it may be entirely possible
that the decision-makers had no intent to harm African Americans. At the
same time, we know from countless studies that biased results occur even
where there is no discriminatory intent.132 Municipal decision makers, like
all of us, implicitly make judgments on the worth and value of particular
people and neighborhoods, and, when those judgments have biased or

Discrimination, 96 HARV. L. REV. 828, 828 (1983)).
132
See Lawrence, supra note 117, at 317; Primus, supra note 117, at 532–33; Peery,
supra note 3, at 481.
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discriminatory results, the fact that the decision maker did not intend the
bias is of no comfort to those impacted.
In the Township of Mt. Holly, for example, it is likely that the
individuals, from those involved in the decision to declare the Gardens
neighborhood “blighted,” to those responsible for generating the
redevelopment plan, harbored implicit biases, which made them more likely
to support the destruction of a minority community (as opposed to a
redevelopment plan that would be more likely to increase integration).
There is little in the text of the Fair Housing Act or the existing Fair
Housing Act jurisprudence to suggest that the Fair Housing Act is meant to
distinguish between the type of implicit bias described above and
intentional discrimination.
C. The Success of the Fair Housing Act Depends on the Survival of
Disparate Impact Jurisprudence
Urban redevelopment decisions are among the main forces shaping
our cities and towns, and, as noted above, disparate treatment analysis alone
is not sufficient to thwart the segregating effects that sometimes flow from
such decisions. If it is to achieve its goal of providing increased and better
housing opportunities for members of protected classes, Fair Housing
advocates need a tool that will address most pressing fair housing
concern—the manner in which municipalities engage in development.
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Recall that the survival of disparate treatment analysis will not
prevent redevelopment of urban areas; instead, it will push municipalities
contemplating redevelopment projects to consider whether there might be a
path towards its legitimate interest that has a lesser disparate impact on a
minority community.

Assuming that the decision-makers within the

municipality have no discriminatory intent, such a push will generally be in
line with the municipality’s goals.

V. RESPONDING TO COMMON CONCERNS
In this section, I respond to some common concerns about disparate
impact analysis—e.g. that it requires race-consciousness in a statutory
context that seems to promote racial blindness; that municipalities and
housing providers will not know how to avoid liability; and that all urban
redevelopment decisions will subject municipalities to litigation.
A. The Fair Housing Act Allows, and in Some Cases Even Requires, Some
Amount of Race-Consciousness

Critics of disparate impact analysis assert that the Fair Housing Act
prohibits decision-making “because of race.”133 Disparate impact analysis,

133

As noted in Section II, section 3604 indicates that
“[I]t shall be unlawful—
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to
refuse to negotiate for the
sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling
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these critics claim, requires decision-makers to consider race, and therefore
the Fair Housing Act or Equal Protection principles must forbid such a
method of analysis.134

Indeed, the critics are right—disparate impact

analysis does require decision-makers to consider race in some instances.
For example, in order to avoid liability under the burden-shifting analysis
described above, decision-makers may need to evaluate whether there are
means to accomplish their objectives that would have a less discriminatory
effect. Municipalities engaged in redevelopment projects such as the one at
issue in the Mt. Holly case might avoid liability by studying the potential
impacts of decisions on particular racial groups in an effort to determine a
path with the least discriminatory outcome.
This type of race-conscious thinking, critics of disparate impact
claim, is precisely the type of race-based decision-making that the Fair
Housing Act sought to eradicate. It is hard to imagine, however, that the
Fair Housing Act is not meant to incentivize municipal decision-makers to
seek the path with the least discriminatory effect when making decisions

to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or
national origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or
facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex,
familial status, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(b) (emphasis added).
134
For a discussion of disparate impact analysis and the Equal Protection Clause, see
generally, Lawrence Rosenthal, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2157, 2179 (2013) and Richard
Primus, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (2010).
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about community redevelopment.
Indeed, the Fair Housing Act does not have a single, race-blind,
purpose. 135 Instead, it appears to have a number of sometimes-conflicting
objectives. On the one hand, one of its goals is to eradicate segregation, or,
as its sponsor, Senator Mondale put it, replace the “ghettos” with “truly
integrated and balanced living patterns.”136 On the other hand, the Fair
Housing Act is clearly also concerned with preventing race from being a
factor in housing related decision-making.137
Even the language in the “purpose” clause of the Fair Housing Act
is, at best, unhelpful in determining whether Congress originally intended
the Fair Housing Act to allow for race-conscious thinking. It indicates that
its purpose is to provide “for fair housing throughout the United States.”138
What “fair housing” means, and whether race can be taken into account at
all in ensuring that it is provided in accordance with the Act, is not made
clear.

135

See SCHWEMM, supra note 27, § 11:3 (noting that the Fair Housing Act’s dual goals
of integration and nondiscrimination are sometimes in conflict with one another).
136
114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968); SCHWEMM, supra note 27, § 2:3.
137
The legislative history of the Fair Housing Act supports the notion that Congress
was concerned with both remedying discrimination and alleviating segregation. Addressing
the issue of segregation, Senator Mondale, the Fair Housing Act’s principle sponsor hoped
that the Fair Housing Act would remedy the alienation of whites and Blacks caused by the
“lack of experience in actually living next” to each other. 114 CONG. REC. 2275 (1968).
Similarly, on the House side, Congressman Celler, the Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee indicated that the purpose of the Fair Housing Act would be to eliminate the
“blight of segregated housing and the pale of the ghetto.” 114 CONG. REC. 9559 (1967).
138
42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012).
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Courts first grappled with the issue of whether the Fair Housing Act
allows for (and perhaps calls for) race-consciousness in two disparate
treatment cases in the early 1970s. In the first, Shannon v. HUD, the Third
Circuit held that the Fair Housing Act’s demand in Section 3608 that the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) act to
“affirmatively to further” fair housing prohibited HUD from funding a
housing project in a minority neighborhood without first considering the
impact that the project would have on racial concentration in the area.139 In
that case, the Court held that HUD could not ignore the negative effects (or
disparate impact) that its decisions might have on minority neighborhoods;
according to the Court, “[t]oday, such color blindness is impermissible.”140
In Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, issued three years
after the Shannon decision, the Second Circuit held that a public housing
agency could favor white applicants over African Americans for units in a
new housing complex if the policy was necessary to maintain integration in
the area.141 In Otero, the housing agency was concerned that, if a raceconscious application program was not used, the complex would “tip” and
become all Black due to white flight. The Court held that a race-conscious
tenant selection system could be used if there was “convincing evidence”

139

Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 816 (3d Cir. 1970).
Id. at 820.
141
See Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
140
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that a color-blind system would “almost surely lead to eventual destruction
of the racial integration that presently exists in the community.”142
The most famous Fair Housing case involving race-conscious
tenant-selection aimed at promoting integration is United States v. Starrett
City Associates.143 In that case, the defendants were owners of a huge
housing complex in New York that consisted of forty-six high-rise
buildings, which housed over 17,000 residents. In order to maintain the
complex as an integrated community, the defendants established a tenant
selection system with strict quotas by race.

Because far more African

American and Latinos applied to be residents, the quota system resulted in
large numbers of minorities being rejected in favor of white applicants. In a
two-to-one decision, the Second Circuit struck down Starrett City’s quota
program, distinguishing it from the program in Otero because Otero’s
program was temporary and related only to the lease-up of apartments while
Starrett City’s program was ongoing. Race-consciousness is acceptable, the
Second Circuit held, as long as it is temporary in nature. Per the Court,
additional factors to consider would be (1) whether the plan or action is
designed to remedy some prior racial discrimination or imbalance and (2)
whether the plan seeks to increase opportunities for minorities as opposed to

142
143

Id. at 1136.
United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988).
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limiting them.144

The Fair Housing Act’s comfort with some amount of raceconsciousness extends beyond tenant-selection programs to other housingrelated decisions as well. For example, HUD has promulgated regulations
requiring participants in federal housing programs to reach out to certain
racial and ethnic groups.145 HUD has also required municipalities utilizing
certain federal funds to certify that the municipality is taking measures to
“affirmatively further fair housing” and to “aid in the prevention or
elimination of slums or blight.”146 In order to ensure that municipalities are
properly furthering fair housing goals, HUD requires municipalities to study
the impacts of proposed housing programs on racial groups and to formulate
responses that promote integration and housing opportunity for members of
protected classes. Indeed, in the time since certiorari was granted in the Mt.
Holly case, HUD has issued two new regulations which explicitly call for
race-consciousness in housing decisions.

The first explains HUD’s

approach to disparate impact cases, and was promulgated, it seems, in direct
response to the question raised in Gallagher and Mt. Holly.147 The second,

144

See generally id. at 1101–02 (explaining that unlike in the affirmative action
context, where “measures designed to increase or ensure minority participation, such as
‘access’ quotas have generally been upheld . . . . [P]rograms designed to maintain
integration by limiting minority participation, such as ceiling quotas are of doubtful
validity”) (internal citations omitted).
145
See 24 C.F.R. § 200.600 et seq.
146
42 U.S.C. § 5304(b)(2), (3) (2012).
147
According to the HUD-issued summary, the rule “formalizes the longstanding
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which is still in draft form, provides a structure through which
municipalities that receive certain federal funds must study the impact of
municipal decision making on housing opportunities for protected
classes.148
Thus, while courts have held that strict quotas that limit housing
opportunities for minorities are not permissible, courts and HUD are
comfortable with some element of race-consciousness in housing, provided
that the race-consciousness furthers the Fair Housing Act’s goal of
promoting integration or providing increased housing opportunities to
members of protected classes.
In summary, the Fair Housing Act’s anti-discrimination principles
interpretation of the Fair Housing Act to include discriminatory effects liability and
establishes a uniform standard of liability for facially neutral practices that have a
discriminatory effect.” 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,479 (Feb. 15, 2013) (to be codified at 24
C.F.R. pt. 100). Under the rule, the burden-shifting approach is as follows: “(1) the
charging party first bears the burden of proving its prima facie case of either disparate
impact or perpetuation of segregation; (2) then the burden shifts to the defendant to prove
that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more of its legitimate,
nondiscriminatory interests; and (3) if the defendant satisfies its burden, the charging party
may still establish liability by demonstrating that the substantial, legitimate,
nondiscriminatory interests could be served by a practice that has a less discriminatory
effect. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2013). By requiring the parties to examine whether there is a
“less discriminatory” path, the HUD rule requires a certain amount of race-conscious
thinking.
148
78 Fed. Reg. 43,710 (proposed July 19, 2013) (according to the HUD-issued
summary of the proposed regulation, the purpose of the regulation is to “focus[] program
participants’ analysis on four primary goals: improving integrated living patterns and
overcoming historic patterns of segregation; reducing racial and ethnic concentrations of
poverty; reducing disparities by race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or
disability in access to community assets such as education, transit access, and employment,
as well as exposure to environmental health hazards and other stressors that harm a
person’s quality of life; and responding to disproportionate housing needs by protected
class.”

IN DEFENSE OF DISPARATE IMPACT

64

are usually primary, and those principles only give way and allow a certain
amount of race-conscious thinking when to do so would further the Fair
Housing Act’s integrationist goals or would prevent policies that have an
unjustified disparate impact on the groups which the Fair Housing Act seeks
to protect.
B. Disparate Impact Analysis Is Not Limitless
The second main critique of the disparate impact theory is that it
knows no bounds and that liability will be found wherever there is proof of
even the slightest disparate impact based on race.149
Disparate impact theory does not call for liability whenever a
disparate impact is detected; indeed, a finding of disparate impact is only
the first step in the analysis—it is what may allow plaintiffs to get to the
courthouse door. But a simple showing of disparate impact alone is not
enough to open those courthouse doors. First, plaintiffs must make out a
prima facie case by showing that a particular practice led or will lead to a
racially disparate result. Pointing to the disparate effect itself is not enough;
plaintiffs must show that a particular policy or action is responsible for the
result.150 Relatedly, plaintiffs must show causation—that is that the policy
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Petitioners’ Opening Brief at 39–44, Twp. of Mount Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens
Citizens in Action, Inc., No. 11-1507 (Aug. 26, 2013).
150
See Vega v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., No. CV-10-02087-PHX-NVW,
2011 WL 2457398, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 20, 2011) (explaining that if Plaintiff cannot point
to any “specific outwardly neutral practices that Defendants took that had a
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or practice in question caused the disparate results.
Additionally, liability will not hold when only minor disparate
impacts are found.151 The statistical evidence used must show that there is a
significant disparity in the effects of a particular policy or decision based on
race.152 Courts scrutinize the statistical evidence carefully, and require that
it show not just that there was some disparate impact, but that the disparate
impact is so severe that to ignore it would be to thwart the purposes of the
Fair Housing Act.153
In addition to placing a heavy burden on the plaintiff, disparate
impact analysis under the Fair Housing Act provides defendants with an
opportunity to explain the disparate impact away; similar to the “business
justification” rule in Title VII cases, defendants in Fair Housing cases can
escape liability if they show that the facially neutral rule or decision which

disproportionate impact upon her based on her race[]” her claim will fail).
151
See Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F. Supp. 2d 33, 62 (D. Mass. 2002)
(“The standard is not just disparate impact, but substantial disparate impact.”).
152
Id. (“[W]here a community has a smaller proportion of minority residents than does
the larger geographical area from which it draws applicants to its Section 8 program, a
selection process that favors its residents cannot but work a disparate impact on
minorities.”).
153
See Khalil v. Farash Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 203, 210 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that
some “numbers are too small to be of any statistical significance . . . . ”), aff’d, 277 Fed.
App’x 81 (2d Cir. 2008); see, e.g., Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565,
575–76 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Statistical evidence is . . . normally used in cases involving fair
housing disparate impact claims”); Pollis v. New School for Social Research, 132 F.3d
115, 121 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The smaller the sample, the greater the likelihood that an
observed pattern is attributable to other factors and accordingly the less persuasive the
inference of discrimination to be drawn from it.”); Waisome v. Port Auth. of New York
and New Jersey, 948 F.2d 1370, 1379 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[W]here statistics are based on a
relatively small number of occurrences, the presence or absence of statistical significance is
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led to the disparate impact is necessary to accomplish a legitimate objective.
Perhaps the most significant limit placed on the disparate impact
theory is that the plaintiff has the burden of showing that there was a less
discriminatory means to achieve the defendant’s objective. The plaintiff
cannot simply assert that the result of a policy is discriminatory; he or she
must also show that there was another way to achieve the same legitimate
policy objective without a disparate impact (or with a significantly less
burdensome disparate impact). If that proves to be an impossible feat, the
defendant will prevail.
This is no small burden.

Indeed, even while recognizing that

disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act, when
they get to the merits of cases, at the appellate level most courts have held
that plaintiffs have failed to carry the burden of proving that the defendant
failed to pursue a less discriminatory alternative.

Indeed, on appeal,

plaintiffs have received positive decisions in less than twenty percent of the
disparate impact claims considered under the Fair Housing Act since its
inception.154
An examination of cases in which plaintiffs did not prevail in

not a reliable indicator of disparate impact.”).
154
Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having any Impact? An Appellate
Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims under the Fair Housing Act, 63 AM. U.
L. REV. ___ (2013)
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disparate impact claims highlights the high bar for such claims. In DarstWebbe Tenant Ass'n Bd. v. St. Louis Housing Authority,155 for example,
plaintiffs sought to thwart plans to replace 758 low income public housing
units with a mix of housing that included only 80 low income housing units.
The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that the plan would have a disparate
impact on African Americans who occupied almost every one of the 758
low income units, but it held that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of
presenting a less discriminatory plan that would accomplish all of the
defendant’s policy objectives.156 Cases such as these highlight the fact that
plaintiffs cannot simply sit back and complain about a disparate impact, no
matter how severe; they must also point to a realistic and sound solution
that the defendant could implement in place of its proposed action.
Despite this high bar, critics of disparate impact analysis still bristle
at the “less discriminatory means” portion of the burden-shifting test.
“Should decision-makers have to waste time studying every possible
alternative to make sure that there is no less discriminatory course of
action?” they ask. Courts in eleven circuits have answered “yes.”157 Given
the long history of racial discrimination that the Fair Housing Act seeks to
remedy and the problems associated with entrenched segregation, courts
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Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 417 F.3d 898 (8th Cir.

2005).
156

Id. at 906.
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have held that it is not too much to ask municipalities and housing providers
to consider the impacts of their decisions on protected classes and seek the
least discriminatory path towards achieving legitimate objectives. In the
Third Circuit’s decision in Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action v. Twp. of
Mount Holly, the court noted:
[t]he Township may be correct that a
disparate impact analysis will often allow
plaintiffs to make out a prima facie case when
a segregated neighborhood is redeveloped in
circumstances where there is a shortage of
alternative affordable housing. But this is a
feature of the FHA’s programming, not a bug.
The FHA is a broadly remedial statute
designed to prevent and remedy invidious
discrimination on the basis of race that
facilitates its antidiscrimination agenda by
encouraging a searching inquiry into the
motives behind a contested policy to ensure
that it is not improper.158
Without disparate impact analysis, municipalities and other
decision-makers will have no incentive to consider the impacts proposed
actions may have on classes protected under the Fair Housing Act; and
without this incentive, there will be little chance that the Fair Housing Act
will nudge our society towards more integrated and fair housing patterns.
Laws are not just means of determining liability; they are structures that
drive behavior. If the Fair Housing Act will have any hope of addressing

157
158

See cases cited supra note 5.
Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375,
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modern housing segregation, it will be because, when making
redevelopment decisions, municipalities will be forced to consider the
potential disparate impacts of municipal actions.
C. An Additional Limit Proposed
As discussed above, even while accepting disparate impact theory as
cognizable, courts have been explicit in highlighting the fact that disparate
impact theory is not without bounds—courts have held that the disparate
impacts must be severe, that plaintiffs have the burden of showing that there
was a less discriminatory means of accomplishing defendants’ goals, and
that a particular policy caused the disparate impact. In addition to those
explicit limitations, courts have often implicitly suggested an additional
limitation—relying on the Fair Housing Act’s dual purpose of prohibiting
discrimination and ending segregation, courts have held that, in order to be
successful, plaintiffs must show that the defendant’s actions would either
limit housing opportunities for members of a protected class (i.e. “otherwise
make unavailable or deny” housing) or increase segregation (or both).159
The Fair Housing Act’s dual goals of prohibiting discrimination and
ending segregation occasionally raises the question of what courts should

384–85 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted).
159
See Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d at 1101, 1103 (“We hold…that Title VIII does
not allow appellants to use rigid racial quotas of indefinite duration to maintain a fixed
level of integration at Starrett City by restricting minority access to scarce and desirable
rental accommodations otherwise available to them.”).
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do when the resolution of a case would put the Fair Housing Act’s antidiscrimination goals in conflict with its anti-segregation goals. Put another
way, what should a court do when the antidiscrimination principle is in
conflict with the “anti-subordination” principle?
Under the antidiscrimination principle, the law should focus on
remedying individual harms caused by discriminatory acts.160 Under the
anti-subordination principle, antidiscrimination law should facilitate the
types of social change necessary to eliminate group-based inequality.161
When these principles are in conflict, courts most often abide by the antidiscrimination principle if doing so would serve members of a protected
class. For example, in Starrett City, asked to decide whether a quota system
that was aimed at maintaining integration was allowable under the Fair
Housing Act, the court determined that the quota system had a
discriminatory effect on African Americans. As described above, because
there were more African Americans on the waiting list for housing in
Starrett City, the quota system served to exclude African Americans even
while it served its integrationist goal.162
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Seicshnaydre, supra note 107, at 1183 (describing Professor Samuel R. Bagenstos’
work on the two purposes of employment discrimination law identified in legal
scholarship).
161
Id.
162
Starrett was, in many ways, a disparate treatment case, not a disparate impact case,
however, presumably the same analysis could apply in disparate impact cases—if a neutral
rule serves to limit housing opportunities for minorities, then such a claim should at least
be cognizable under the Fair Housing Act.
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This seems like the right result. Though the Fair Housing Act’s
stated purpose to provide “for Fair Housing throughout the United States” is
a bit vague, it certainly seems that it would be antithetical to our basic
understanding of “fairness” if the Act served to disadvantage African
Americans in order to support integration.
CONCLUSION
Housing segregation and lack of housing opportunities for the
communities that the Fair Housing Act purports to protect is at the root of
many of our country’s societal ills, from gaps in educational achievement
across color lines, to disparities in employment opportunities. Emphasizing
the intent behind individual acts, rather than the “cumulative effects of
government

and

private

decisions

on

historically

disadvantaged

communities of color, obscures the complex connection between housing
segregation and many other societal ills.”163
Interestingly, the Supreme Court increasingly seems frustrated by
confronting the “branches” of racial inequality that grow from the roots of
housing segregation—as Justice O’Conner expressed in the affirmative
action context in Grutter v. Bollinger164, and as was recently affirmed in
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Amicus Brief in Mt. Holly, submitted by Howard University School of Law on
behalf of Empower DC, 26. Citing Kenneth L. Karst, Equal Citizenship at Ground Level:
The Consequences of Nonstate Action, 54 DUKE L.J. 1591, 1606–07 (2005).
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539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (proposing at 25 year limit on affirmative action policies)
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Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,165 some on the Supreme Court feel
that there should be a time limit on remedying our racist past. The Supreme
Court seems to have what I term “racial fatigue”—that is, it appears tired of
litigation related to our racist past, as opposed to what it sees as our raceneutral present. If the Supreme Court wishes to see fewer cases dealing with
disparities in education or employment across racial lines, then it must not
render the Fair Housing Act – the legislation aimed at remedying the roots
of those problems – impotent.
While the debate about whether the Fair Housing Act allows for the
type of race-conscious thinking that is called for in disparate impact
analysis will likely rage on, when one examines how redevelopment
decisions are actually made, it becomes clear that a myopic hunt for intent
may be fruitless. In the complex and diffuse decision-making process that
is at the heart of all redevelopment activity, it is the effects of such
decisions, not the intent behind those decisions, which really matter. As the
Supreme Court stated in Jones v. Mayer Co., “when racial discrimination
herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy property turn on the
color of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery.”166
***
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133 S. Ct. 2411
Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 442–43 (1968).

